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Abstract—The Nisan-Ronen conjecture states that no truth-
ful mechanism for makespan-minimization when allocating m
tasks to n unrelated machines can have approximation ratio
less than n. Over more than two decades since its formulation,
little progress has been made in resolving it and the best known
lower bound is still a small constant. This work makes progress
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I. INTRODUCTION
This work makes progress on one of the most important
open problems of algorithmic mechanism design [26], the
Nisan-Ronen conjecture. Mechanism design, a celebrated
branch of Game Theory and Microeconomics, studies a spe-
cial class of algorithms, called mechanisms, which are robust
under selfish behavior and produce a social outcome with
a certain guaranteed quality. Unlike traditional algorithms
that get their input from a single user, mechanisms solicit
the input from different participants (called agents, players,
bidders), in the form of preferences over the possible outputs
(outcomes). The challenge stems from the fact that the
actual preferences of the participants are private information,
unknown to the algorithm. The participants are assumed to
be utility maximisers that will provide some input that suits
their objective and may differ from their true preferences. A
truthful mechanism provides incentives such that a truthful
input is the best action for each participant.
The question is what kind of problems can be solved
within this framework. In their seminal paper that launched
the field of algorithmic mechanism design, Nisan and Ro-
nen [25] proposed the scheduling problem on unrelated
machines as a central problem to capture the algorithmic
aspects of mechanism design. In the classical form of
the problem, which has been extensively studied from the
algorithmic perspective, there are n machines that process
a set of m tasks; each machine i takes time tij to process
task j. The objective of the algorithm is to allocate each
task to a machine in order to minimize the makespan,
i.e., the maximum completion time of all machines. In the
mechanism design setting, each machine provides as input
its processing times for each task. The selection by Nisan
and Ronen of this version of the scheduling problem to study
the limitations that truthfulness imposes on algorithm design
was a masterstroke, because it turned out to be an extremely
rich and challenging setting.
Nisan and Ronen applied the VCG mechanism [28], [12],
[18], the most successful generic machinery in mechanism
design, which truthfully implements the outcome that max-
imizes the social welfare. In the case of scheduling, the
allocation of the VCG is the greedy allocation: each task
is independently assigned to the machine with minimum
processing time. This mechanism is truthful, but has poor
approximation ratio, n. They boldly conjectured that this is
the best guarantee that can be achieved by any deterministic
(polynomial-time or not) truthful mechanism.
Conjecture 1 (Nisan-Ronen). There is no deterministic
truthful mechanism with approximation ratio better than n
for the problem of scheduling n unrelated machines.
The conjectured bound refers only to the limitation that
truthfulness imposes and does not preclude any compu-
tational limitations. In that sense, this is a very strong
information-theoretic bound which should hold for all de-
terministic mechanisms, regardless of their running time.
The Nisan-Ronen conjecture is perhaps the most famous
problem and, arguably, one of the most important open ones
in algorithmic mechanism design. Despite intensive efforts,
very sparse progress has been made towards its resolution.
All the known lower bounds are small constants; Nisan
and Ronen originally showed that no truthful deterministic
mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio better than
2. This was improved to 2.41 [11], and later to 2.61 [19],
which was the current best for over a decade. Very recently
the bound was improved to 2.755 by Giannakopoulos,
Hamerl and Poças [16] and then to 3 by Dobzinski and
Shaulker [14]. Still the gap from the best known upper bound
of n remains huge.
In this work we take a solid step towards the resolution
of the conjecture by providing a drastic improvement on the
lower bound.
Theorem 2. There is no deterministic truthful mechanism
with approximation ratio better than 1 +
√
n− 1 for the
problem of scheduling n unrelated machines.
The proof of the theorem1 is presented in Section III. At
its core, it is based on the use of a known characterization
of 2× 2 instances, with only two machines and 2 tasks [8].
Roughly speaking, this characterization says essentially that
the only available algorithms for 2 × 2 instances are either
task independent (algorithms that allocate each task indepen-
dently of the values of the other tasks) or affine minimizers
(algorithms that compare simple linear expressions of the
input values to allocate the tasks). This is an extremely
limited class of algorithms, a fact that provides some weak
evidence that the Nisan-Ronen conjecture may be true. No
such characterization is known for 3 or more machines,
and a widely-held belief has been that attacking the Nisan-
Ronen conjecture requires further progress in this direction
of characterizing truthful mechanisms for n machines. It is
therefore quite surprising that one can obtain a lower bound
of 1+
√
n− 1 based mainly on the characterization of 2×2
instances.
Another cornerstone of the proof of the main theorem
is the extensive use of weak monotonicity, the character-
izing property of truthful allocation functions. It is well
known [27], [1] that a mechanism is truthful if its allocation
function is monotone in the values of each machine. Weak
monotonicity in one dimension (i.e., a single task) is the
usual notion of monotonicity of the allocation function, and
for two or more dimensions, it takes a particular very natural
form. Thus one can restate the main theorem as “no mono-
tone algorithm, polynomial-time or not, has approximation
ratio less than 1 +
√
n− 1 for the problem of scheduling n
unrelated machines”. In contrast, the approximation ratio for
the usual (non-monotone) class of algorithms is trivially 1,
for exponential-time algorithms, and 2 for polynomial-time
ones [21]. To use weak monotonicity, we consider pertur-
bations of an input that lie in a small open hyperrectangle.
The precise definition of these perturbations needs to balance
different requirements of the proof, but we believe that the
general idea can be useful in other similar situations.
Previous attempts for resolving the Nisan-Ronen conjec-
ture employed a characterization of 2 × 2 instances and,
of course, weak monotonicity. What distinguishes this work
from these previous attempts, with the exception of [8], is
the use of particular inputs with some very high values that
force any reasonable algorithm to allocate each task to only
two machines. These inputs avoid the problems that weak
monotonicity presents for multiple players: with such inputs,
when one machine does not take a task, we know precisely
which machine takes it.
Some ideas of this work, such as the use of the 2 × 2
characterization on particular inputs, first appeared in a
recent publication [8]. The main result in [8] is a lower
bound of
√
n− 1 for all deterministic truthful mechanisms,
1Due to space limitations most proofs are omitted. We refer the reader
to the full version https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.14434.
when the cost of processing a subset of tasks is given by
a submodular (or supermodular) set function, instead of an
additive function of the standard scheduling setting.
The instances employed in [8] for submodular costs use
only n−1 pairs of tasks. But here, where costs are additive,
we use exponentially many tasks. We don’t know whether
this large number of tasks is needed in general, but it is
essential in our proof. It definitely needs to be Ω(n3/2)
for the type of instances that we use, since for fewer tasks




The real challenge, not present in [8], is that the charac-
terization of 2 × 2 truthful mechanisms for additive costs
includes mechanisms which are difficult to handle (for
example, relaxed task independent mechanisms and relaxed
affine minimizers). This obstacle adds many complications
and requires a different proof structure.
The major open problem left open is to settle the Nisan-
Ronen conjecture. The techniques of this work may be
helpful in this direction. The case of randomized or frac-
tional mechanisms appears to be more challenging; the best
known lower bound of the approximation ratio is 2 [24],
[7], embarrassingly lower than the best known upper bound
(n + 1)/2 [7]. The bottleneck of applying the techniques
of the current work to these variants appears to be the lack
of a good characterization of 2 × 2 mechanisms. Finally,
although the result of this work indicates that mechanisms
constitute a limited subclass of allocation algorithms, a
more direct demonstration would be to find other useful
properties of mechanisms, or even obtain a more global
characterization of mechanisms for the domain of scheduling
and its generalizations.
A. Further related work
The lack of progress in the original unrelated machine
problem led to the study of variants and special cases,
for which significant results have been obtained. Ashlagi
et al. [2], resolved a restricted version of the Nisan-Ronen
conjecture, for the special but natural class of anonymous
mechanisms. Lavi and Swamy [20] studied a restricted input
domain which however retains the multi-dimensional flavour
of the setting. They considered inputs with only two possible
values “low” and “high”, that are publicly known to the de-
signer of the algorithm. For this case they showed an elegant
deterministic mechanism with an approximation factor of 2.
They also showed that even for this setting achieving the
optimal makespan is not possible under truthfulness, and
provided a lower bound of 11/10. Yu [30] extended the
results for a range of values, and Auletta et al. [3] studied
multi-dimensional domains where the private information of
the machines is a single bit.
Randomized mechanisms have also been studied and have
slightly improved guarantees. There are two notions of truth-
fulness for randomized mechanisms; a mechanism is uni-
versally truthful if it is defined as a probability distribution
over deterministic truthful mechanisms, and it is truthful-in-
expectation, if in expectation no player can benefit by lying.
In [25], a universally truthful mechanism was proposed for
the case of two machines, and was later extended to the
case of n machines by Mu’alem and Schapira [24] with
an approximation guarantee of 0.875n, which was later im-
proved to 0.837n by [22]. Lu and Yu [23] showed a truthful-
in-expectation mechanism with an approximation guarantee
of (n + 5)/2. Mu’alem and Schapira [24], showed a lower
bound of 2 − 1/n, for both types of randomized truthful
mechanisms. Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Kovács [7]
extended the lower bound for fractional mechanisms, where
each task can be fractionally allocated to multiple machines.
They also showed a fractional mechanism with a guarantee
of (n+ 1)/2. Even for the special case of two machines the
upper and lower bounds are close but not tight [23], [6].
In the Bayesian setting, Daskalakis and Weinberg [13]
showed a mechanism that is at most a factor of 2 from
the optimal truthful mechanism, but not with respect to
optimal makespan. Chawla et al. [5] provided bounds
of prior-independent mechanisms (where the input comes
from a probability distribution unknown to the mecha-
nism). Giannakopoulos and Kyropoulou [17] showed that
the VCG mechanism achieves an approximation ratio of
O(log n/ log log n) under some distributional and symme-
try assumptions. Finally, in a recent work, Christodoulou,
Koutsoupias and Kovács [9] showed positive results for
settings where each task can only be allocated to at most
two machines, a property shared by the instances of the
lower bound of this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In the unrelated machines scheduling problem, we are
given a set M of m tasks that need to be scheduled on a
set N of n machines. The processing time or cost that each
machine i needs to process task j is tij , and the completion
time of machine i for a subset S of tasks is equal to the sum
of the individual task costs ti(S) =
∑
j∈S tij . The objective
is to find an allocation of tasks to machines that minimize
the makespan, that is, the maximum completion time of a
machine. We sometimes refer to the cost of a set of tasks
S, as the optimal makespan with respect to S.
A. Mechanism design setting
We assume that each machine i ∈ N is controlled by a
selfish agent (player) that is reluctant to process tasks and
the costs tij is private information known only to them (also
called the type of agent i). The set Ti of possible types of
agent i consists of all vectors bi = (bi1, . . . , bim) ∈ Rm+ . Let
also T = ×i∈NTi be the space of type profiles.
A mechanism defines for each player i a set Bi of
available strategies the player can choose from. We consider
direct revelation mechanisms, i.e., Bi = Ti for all i, meaning
that the players strategies are to simply report their types to
the mechanism. Each player i provides a bid bi ∈ Ti, which
not necessarily matches the true type ti, if this serves their
interests. A mechanism (A,P) consists of two parts:
An allocation algorithm:: The allocation algorithm A
allocates the tasks to machines based on the players’ inputs
(bid vector) b = (b1, . . . , bn). Let A be the set of all possible
partitions of m tasks to n machines. The allocation function
A : T → A partitions the tasks into the n machines; we
denote by Ai(b) the subset of tasks assigned to machine i
for bid vector b = (b1, . . . , bn).
A payment scheme:: The payment scheme P =
(P1, . . . ,Pn) determines the payments, which also depends
on the bid vector b. The functions P1, . . . ,Pn stand for
the payments that the mechanism hands to each agent, i.e.,
Pi : T → R.
The utility ui of a player i is the payment that they get
minus the actual time that they need to process the set of
tasks assigned to them, ui(b) = Pi(b) − ti(Ai(b)). We are
interested in truthful mechanisms. A mechanism is truthful,
if for every player, reporting his true type is a dominant
strategy. Formally,
ui(ti, b−i) ≥ ui(t′i, b−i), ∀i ∈ [n], ti, t′i ∈ Ti, b−i ∈ T−i,
where notation T−i denotes all parts of T except its i-th
part.
The quality of a mechanism for a given type t is measured
by the makespan MECH(t) achieved by its allocation algo-
rithm A, MECH(t) = maxi∈N ti(Ai(t)), which is compared
to the optimal makespan OPT(t) = minA∈Amaxi∈N ti(Ai).
It is well known that only a subset of algorithms can be
allocation algorithms of truthful mechanisms. In particular,
no mechanism’s allocation algorithm is optimal for every
t, so it is natural to focus on the approximation ratio of
the mechanism’s allocation algorithm. A mechanism is c-
approximate, if its allocation algorithm is c-approximate,
that is, if c ≥ MECH(t)OPT(t) for all possible inputs t.
In this work, we do not place any requirements on the time
to compute the mechanism’s allocation A and payments P.
In other words, the lower bound does not make use of any
computational assumptions.
B. Weak monotonicity
Mechanisms consist of two algorithms, the allocation
algorithm and the payment algorithm. However, we are only
interested in the performance of the allocation algorithm.
Therefore it is natural to ask whether it is possible to
characterize the class of allocation algorithms that are part
of a truthful mechanism with no reference to the payment
algorithm. Indeed the following definition provides such a
characterization.
Definition 3. An allocation algorithm A is called weakly
monotone (WMON) if it satisfies the following property:
for every two inputs t = (ti, t−i) and t′ = (t′i, t−i), the
associated allocations A and A′ satisfy
ti(Ai)− ti(A′i) ≤ t′i(Ai)− t′i(A′i).
An equivalent condition, using aij(t) ∈ {0, 1} indicator
variables of whether task j is allocated to player i, is∑
j∈M
(aij(t
′)− aij(t))(t′ij − tij) ≤ 0.
It is well known that the allocation function of every truth-
ful mechanism is weakly monotone [4]. Although it is not
needed in establishing a lower bound on the approximation
ratio, it turns out that this is also a sufficient condition for
truthfulness in convex domains [27] (which is the case for
the scheduling domain).
A useful tool in our proof relies on the following immedi-
ate consequence of weak monotonicity (see [8] for a simple
proof). Intuitively, it states that when you fix the costs of
all players for a subset of tasks, then the restriction of the
allocation to the rest of the tasks is still weakly monotone.
Lemma 4. Let A be a weakly monotone allocation, and let
(S, T ) a partition of M . When we fix the costs of the tasks
of T , the restriction of the allocation A on S is also weakly
monotone.
The following implication of weak monotonicity, that was
first used in [25], is a standard tool for showing lower bounds
for truthful mechanisms (see for example [25], [11], [24],
[2], [16], [14]).
Lemma 5. Consider a truthful mechanism (A,P) and its
allocation for a bid vector t. Let S be a subset of the tasks
allocated to player i and let S′ be a subset of the tasks
allocated to the other players. Consider any bid profile t′ =
(t′i, t−i) that is obtained from t by decreasing the values of
player i in S, i.e., t′ij < tij , j ∈ S, and increasing the values
of player i in S′, i.e., t′ij > tij , j ∈ S′. Then the allocation
of player i for t and t′ agree for all tasks in S ∪ S′.
Notice that this lemma guarantees that only the set S of
tasks allocated to player i remains the same. This does not
preclude changing the allocation of the other players for the
tasks in S′, unless there are only two players. This is a major
obstacle in multi-player settings, that we avoid in this work
by focusing on only two players for each task.
C. Characterization of truthful mechanisms for 2 players
and 2 tasks.
In this section we discuss the class of truthful 2 × 2
mechanisms (i.e., for 2 machines and 2 tasks). We present
here a full characterization of these mechanisms as it appears
in the full version of [8].
There are other such characterizations in the literature
(for example [15], [10]), but they are somewhat incomplete,
in the sense that they either impose additional restrictions
to mechanisms (for example, bounded approximation ratio)
or consider a bigger domain with negative values. These
characterizations do not fit the purpose of this work. For ex-
ample, we deal with domains with multiple players and tasks
and conditions on the approximation ratio of restrictions to
only 2 tasks are not applicable.
An important aspect of our approach is to restrict the
allocation of each task to only two specific machines, which
we call player (machine) t and player s. To achieve this,
we fix two large constants Θ and B with Θ  B  1,
and consider instances in which the value for the t-player
can be arbitrary, for the s player in [0, B), and for the other
players equal to Θ. Since the values of the s-player are much
smaller than Θ, if the mechanism allocates even one task to
a player with value Θ, its approximation ratio is really high.
A convenient aspect of the characterization of [8], is
that it characterizes the 2 × 2 mechanisms with values
exactly in this domain. We first present the theorem and
then define and discuss the different types of mechanisms.
The characterization assumes that for sufficiently high values
of t-player, both tasks will be allocated to the s-player,
otherwise the approximation ratio is unbounded, even when
there are more players and tasks.
Theorem 6 (Characterization of 2 × 2 mechanisms [8]).
For every B ∈ R>0 ∪ {∞}, every weakly monotone al-
location for two tasks and two additive players with bids
t ∈ [0,∞)× [0,∞) and s ∈ [0, B)× [0, B) —such that for
every s there exists t for which both tasks are allocated
to the second player— belongs to the following classes:
(1) relaxed affine minimizers (including the special case of
affine minimizers), (2) relaxed task independent mechanisms
(including the special case of task independent mechanisms),
(3) 1-dimensional mechanisms, (4) constant mechanisms.2
Note that the theorem applies also to unbounded domain,
i.e., the case of B = ∞. Some mechanisms can be of two
types; for example the VCG mechanism is both an affine
minimizer and task independent.
To discuss the different types of mechanisms of the
theorem, let (A,P) be a truthful 2 × 2 mechanism, where
A is a weakly monotone allocation function, and P denotes
the payment function. For given fixed s ∈ [0, B)× [0, B) let
us consider the allocation for the t-player depending on his
own bids (t1, t2) (see Figure 1). The allocation regions R12
(resp. R1, R2, R∅) ⊆ R2≥0 are defined to be the interior (wrt.
R2≥0) of the set of all t values such that the t-player gets
the set of tasks {1, 2} (resp. {1}, {2}, ∅). The allocation of
the points on the boundaries can take any allocation of the
adjacent regions.
It is known that in the case of two tasks, for a fixed s, these
2To be precise, the restriction of every weakly monotone allocation to
strictly positive t and s is of type (1) to (4); on the border 0 there might
be singularities, see [8] for details. For this reason, in the main argument






















Figure 1. The allocation to the t-player depending on their own bid
vector (t1, t2) for fixed values s = (s1, s2) of the other player: (a)
quasi-bundling allocation; (b) quasi-flipping allocation; (c) crossing
allocation. The boundary ψ1(t2, s) for task 1 is shown by a dashed
line.
regions in a weakly monotone allocation subdivide R2≥0
basically in three possible ways (as in Figure 1), which are
characteristic for the type of the whole allocation-function
A. Similar subdivisions for multiple tasks exist in higher
dimensions [10], [29].
Definition 7. The allocation of a mechanism is defined by
its boundary functions ψi(t−i, s), the infimum of the values
of task ti for which the t-player does not get task i. In other
words, the t-player gets task i when ti < ψi(t−i, s) and it
does not get it when ti > ψi(t−i, s).
For a given s, we call the allocation for the t-player
• quasi-bundling, if there are at least two points t 6= t′
on the boundary of R12 and R∅. In this case, we say
that the boundary between R12 and R∅ is a bundling
boundary.
• quasi-flipping, if there are at least two points t 6= t′ on
the boundary of R1 and R2.
• crossing, otherwise. (See Figure 1 for an illustration.)
Relaxed affine minimizers.: An allocation is an affine
minimizer, if there exist positive constants λ′, λ and con-
stants πa ∈ R ∪ {−∞,∞} for each allocation a ∈
{12, 1, 2, ∅}, so that for every input (t, s) the allocation of
the t-player minimizes the corresponding expression among
the following:
λ′(t1 + t2) + π12, λ
′ t1 + λ s2 + π1, (1)
λ′ t2 + λ s1 + π2, λ(s1 + s2) + π∅. (2)
An affine minimizer allocation has typically either the form
of Figure 1.a or 1.b.
Since we consider nonnegative values, the domain is
bounded below. When an affine minimizer has the bundling
form (Figure 1.a), it may be the case that for small s1 + s2
and t1 + t2, the mechanism locally ‘looks like’ a bundling
mechanism, with only the regions R∅ and R12 for both
players. If this is the case for all (s1, s2) with s1 + s2 <
Ds and all (t1, t2) such that t1 + t2 < Dt for some
given Dt, Ds > 0, then the mechanism becomes locally
a bundling mechanism. As such, the boundary functions



















Figure 2. An example of a relaxed affine minimizer, which shows
the allocation of the t-player for two distinct values of s. The
left figure shows the allocation for some s1 ≥ 1 and s2 ≥ 1;
in this case, the boundaries are linear; for example, when t2 ∈
[s2−1, s2] the allocation for task 1 is determined by comparing t1
to ψ1(t2, s) = s1 +s2−1. The right figure shows the allocation at
the bundling tail for some s1, s2 ≤ 1, in which case the boundary
does not have to be linear; for example for t2 ∈ [0,
√
(s1 + s2)/2],
we have ψ1(t2, s) =
√
(s1 + s2)/2.
s and t and the boundary between R12 and R∅ is given by
t1 + t2 = ζ(s1 + s2), for some non-decreasing function ζ.
See Figure 2 for an example. For a formal definition of these
mechanisms, which are called relaxed affine minimizers, we
refer the reader to [8], where they were introduced.
We will refer to the (potentially) non-linear bundling
allocation of a relaxed affine minimizer as its “bundling
tail”. In other words, the bundling tail of a relaxed affine
minimizer is determined by the values of s for which the
allocation of the t-player contains only the regions R12
and R∅. Note that affine minimizers is simply the special
subclass of these mechanisms in which the bundling tail is
missing or conforms to (1).
The important aspect of affine minimizers and of relaxed
affine minimizers outside their bundling tail is that the
boundary ψi(t−i, s) is a truncated linear function in si, and
in particular of the form
ψi(t−i, s) = max(0, λsi − γ(t−i, s−i)),
where λ is a constant and γ(t−i, s−i) a function that does
not depend on the values of task i. Note that when we
consider a 2×2 mechanism as a restriction of a mechanism
with multiple players and tasks, the coefficient λ is not
an absolute constant but it can depend in an arbitrary way
on values outside the 2 × 2 slice (see Definition 9 for the
definition of slice); similarly for the function γ.
Relaxed task independent allocations.: An allocation
function A is task independent if for both tasks the allocation
of task i depends only on the input values si and ti. For
the t-player, the boundary of t1, i.e., the lowest value,
above which t1 does not get task 1, is determined by an
arbitrary non-decreasing function ψ1 : [0, B) → [0,∞) of
s1 and analogously for the boundary ψ2(s2). Geometrically,
in a task independent mechanism, the allocations of both
players are always crossing (Figure 1.c). In a relaxed task
independent mechanism the latter property is fulfilled in all
but countably many s (resp. t) points, in which both ψ1
and ψ2 (resp. ψ−11 and ψ
−1
2 ) have a jump discontinuity.
See [8] for a formal definition. The important property
that we use here is that every relaxed task independent
allocation is identical with a task independent allocation on
ti ∈ [0,∞) \ Ti, si ∈ [0, B) \ Si, where the T1, T2, S1, S2
are countable sets.
1-dimensional mechanisms.: In a 1-dimensional mech-
anism at most two possible allocations are ever realized.
If the two occuring allocations are ∅ and 12, we call the
mechanism bundling mechanism. One can consider bundling
1-dimensional mechanisms as degenerate relaxed affine min-
imizers with π1 = π2 =∞.
The other cases when the allocations to the t-player
are ∅ and 1 (or ∅ and 2) are degenerate task independent
allocations, and for our purposes they can be treated as task
independent.
Constant mechanisms.: In a constant or dictatorial
mechanism the allocation is independent of the bids of at
least one of the players. This property can also be interpreted
as being an affine minimizer with a multiplicative constant
λ = 0.
III. LOWER BOUND
In this section, we give a proof of our main result. In
Sections III-A and III-B, we describe the general setting,
provide important definitions, and set the main goal. With
these at hand, we outline the proof in Section III-C. Then
in Sections III-D, III-E, and III-F we provide the proofs of
all the technical lemmas needed in order to establish the
main theorem, the proof of which is presented in the last
subsection (Section III-G).
A. The construction
We consider instances, with n players and m = (` +
1)(n − 1) + n , for some large ` to be determined later.
Player 0 is special and for convenience we use the symbol t
for its values; sometimes we refer to it as the t-player or 0-
player. We use the symbol s for the values of the remaining
players 1, . . . , n−1, and sometimes we refer to them as the
s-players.
There are n tasks d0, . . . , dn−1, which are special that
are called dummy tasks; they play a limited role in the proof
and their only purpose is to increase the lower bound from√
n− 1 to 1 +
√
n− 1.
The remaining tasks are partitioned into n − 1 clusters
C1, . . . , Cn−1, where each cluster Ci contains ` + 1 tasks
and is associated with player i ∈ [n− 1]. We call two tasks
j and j′ that belong to the same cluster siblings.
Definition 8 (Range of input values). The processing times
for a task j ∈ Ci, i ∈ [n− 1], is described by two values tj
and sj , as follows:
• player 0 has processing time tj ∈ (0,∞); with very
few exceptions, the argument uses values tj ∈ (0, 1].
• player i has processing time sj ∈ (0, B), for some
B; again with very few exceptions, the argument uses
values sj ∈ (0, 1].
• every other player k 6∈ {0, i} has processing time Θ,
for some Θ.
Dummy task di has value Θ for all players except for player
i for which the value is initially 0.
The values of B and Θ are arbitrarily large functions of n
(exponential functions suffice to get a good approximation
ratio) with Θ/((`+ 1)B) n.
Since every task has at least one processing time in [0, B),
no algorithm with approximation ratio less than Θ/((` +
1)B) n, allocates any task to players with value Θ.
An instance (input) T is described only by two values tj
and sj per task j. Let’s denote by t, and s the respective
vectors, hence, T = (t, s) = (tj , sj)j∈[m].
B. Definitions
We use the following fixed values throughout this section.
• α = 1/
√
n− 1
• β, an arbitrarily small positive value
• δ, a small value; think of this as n−2; any value
o(n−3/2) gives lower bound 1+(1−o(1))
√
n− 1. For
simplicity, we will assume that δ is selected so that
2n/δ is an integer.
• δ′ = 2δ, upper bound on the cost of a trivial cluster
(see definition of a trivial cluster below)
• ρ, the targeted lower bound on the approximation ratio,
which is given by






1 + (n− 1)δ′
}
= 1 + (1− o(1))
√
n− 1,
• `+1 number of tasks per cluster; exponential in n, and






The proof is based on the characterization of 2×2 mech-
anisms. To be able to use it, we fix all other values except
for the values of two tasks and then use the characterization.
The next definition formalizes this.
Definition 9 (Slice). Fix an instance T and two tasks p
and p′. The set of instances that agree with T on all tasks
except for the tasks p and p′ is called a (p, p′)-slice for T or
simply slice of tasks p and p′. A slice may involve values
of 3 different players, if p, p′ belong to different clusters, or
values of 2 players if p, p′ are siblings. In the latter case, the
allocation of these tasks (due to Lemma 4) is defined by a
2× 2 mechanism which we call (p, p′)-slice mechanism for
T .
To take advantage of weak monotonicity, we need to
consider perturbations of instances, that is, instances that
differ by a small amount from a given one. Here is a precise
definition of the perturbations that we use.
Definition 10 (Perturbations of an instance). Fix an instance
T = (t, s) and a set of tasks P . Let V be a vector of open
intervals Vj , one for each task j ∈ P , such that
• Vj = (tj , tj + θj), for every task j ∈ P , for some
θj ∈ (0, β)
The set of instances T ′ = (t′, s) with t′j ∈ Vj , when j ∈ P ,
and t′j = tj when j 6∈ P , is called a set of V -perturbations
of T for tasks P or simply set of V -perturbations of T ,
when P is understood from the context.
Note that we consider perturbations only of t-values and
only in one direction (towards higher values). The values of
instance T itself are not in the perturbation for tasks in P .
Perturbations of an instance T satisfy a few important
properties:
• for any given allocation, the cost of all instances of a
perturbation is almost the same as the cost of T (within
(n− 1)|P |β).
• they allow us to select points not on boundaries of the
mechanism, thus when we apply weak monotonicity for
the 0-player, we can guarantee that certain allocations
do not change.
The central part of the argument is an induction on
the number k of clusters. The values of the tasks in the
remaining n− k− 1 clusters, which we call trivial clusters,
play a limited role, but it is important that they do not affect
substantially the approximation ratio. We allow their values
to be arbitrary (within the limits of Definition 8), but we
require that one of the values is very small in the following
sense.
Definition 11 (Trivial cluster). A cluster is called trivial for
a given instance T if the optimal allocation for all tasks of
the cluster has cost at most δ′.
We usually select a single task from each non-trivial
cluster. We now fix the terminology for such sets of tasks:
Definition 12 (Regular set of tasks). A set of tasks is called
regular if they are from different clusters.
We make repeated use of the following set of instances:
Definition 13 (Standard instance and T̂ (P )). An instance T
is standard for a set of clusters C if the following conditions
hold
• the value of every task j ∈ ∪C is [tj = β, sj = 1], and
• the remaining clusters are trivial
We also say that T is standard for a regular set of tasks
P = {p1, . . . , pk}, if it is standard for the set of clusters
that intersect P . We denote by T̂ (P ) the instance that agrees
with T everywhere except for tasks in P for which [t̂pi =
α, ŝpi = 1]
k
i=1. See Figure 3 for an illustration.
The following definition is at the heart of the proof.
Roughly speaking, the aim of the proof is to show by
induction that there exist good sets of n−1 tasks, otherwise
the mechanism has high approximation ratio.
Definition 14 (Good set of tasks). Fix a mechanism, a set
of regular tasks P = {p1, . . . , pk} from a set of clusters
C, and a standard instance T for P . The set of tasks P is
called good for instance T if there exists a vector V of open
intervals for the tasks in P such that the mechanism allocates
all tasks in P to the 0-player for every instance in the set
of V -perturbations of T̂ (P ) for tasks in P . We call V the
witness of goodness of P . (See Figure 3 for an illustration.)
If no such V exists, we call P a bad set. A singleton bad
set will be simply called bad task. For technical reasons, we
will also call a task bad when it has all the above properties
of a bad task, but its s-value is 1 − ε, for some arbitrarily
small ε > 0.3
T =
 β β β β β β δ β β1 1 1 1 1 1
1/2 1 1
 ,
T̂ ({1, 5}) =
 α β β β α β δ β β1 1 1 1 1 1
1/2 1 1

Figure 3. T and T̂ are two instances with 4 players and 3 clusters,
where rows correspond to players and columns to tasks. The values
Θ and the dummy tasks are omitted. Typical values of the constants
are β ≈ 0, δ ≈ n−2, α ≈ n−1/2. T is a standard instance for
clusters {C1, C2}. C3 is a trivial cluster because it has cost δ +
2β ≤ δ′. If there exists a V such that tasks 1 ∈ C1, and 5 ∈ C2
are assigned to the 0-player for every instance in the set of V -
perturbations of T̂ ({1, 5}), then {1, 5} is a good set for T .
Now that we have the definition of a set of good tasks,
we can state the main lemma of this section.
Lemma 15 (Main Lemma). At least one of the following
three properties hold for every truthful mechanism:
(i) the approximation ratio is at least ρ
(ii) there exists a bad task
(iii) there exists a good set of n− 1 tasks.
The aim of this section is to prove this lemma by assuming
that Properties (i) and (ii) do not hold and then show
Property (iii).
Assumption 16. For the rest of this section, we assume that
the approximation ratio is less than






(1 + (n− 1)δ′)
}
and that there is no bad task.
3In particular, a task will be bad if for every ε′ > 0, there is a 0 ≤ ε < ε′,
so that setting its s-value to 1−ε, the task has the above properties. This will
serve to exclude singular points of relaxed task independent mechanisms.
Before we give the proof of the Main Lemma, we discuss
how it will be used to prove a lower bound of 1 +
√
n− 1
on the approximation ratio (Section III-G contains a detailed
derivation). We provide here a high-level argument. Property
(i) immediately implies the lower bound. The existence of
a bad task (Property (ii)) means that there is only one
non-trivial task j with values [tj = α, sj = 1] and the
mechanism gives it to the s-player. In this case, the approx-
imation ratio is approximately 1/α =
√
n− 1, which can
be improved to 1 +
√
n− 1 using the dummy tasks. Finally,
a good set of n− 1 tasks (Property (iii)) has approximation
ratio approximately (n − 1)α =
√
n− 1, which again can
be improved to 1 +
√
n− 1 using the dummy tasks, giving
the desired result.
To obtain a proof of the Main Lemma, we will show that
there exists a good set of k tasks for every k ∈ [n− 1], by
induction on k. To show existence of good sets of k tasks,
we start with some set of k tasks, which we call potentially-
good set, such that all its subsets of k−1 tasks are good. To
satisfy all the requirements in the proof, the precise structure
of a potentially-good set of tasks is complicated and it is
detailed in the following definition (see Figure 4).
Definition 17 (Potentially-good set of tasks). Fix a mecha-
nism. A set of regular tasks P = (p1, . . . , pk) from a set of
clusters C is called potentially-good for an instance T if T
is standard for P and the following conditions hold
• for every i ∈ [k], P−i = P \{pi} is good for T ; let V i
denote a witness of goodness of P−i
• P−k is good (with witness V k) for every instance that
results from T when we replace the values4 of task pk
with [tpk = δ, spk = qδ/(2n)], for q = 0, 1, . . . , 2n/δ.
The witness V of potential goodness of P is defined as
follows: for task pi take the intersection of all relevant
intervals in V j , j 6= i.
Remark. One can replace δ/(2n) by δ/(2ρ) in the above
definition to reduce the required number of `+ 1 tasks per
cluster, but we opt for simplicity.
C. Outline
We now give a rough outline of the argument that estab-
lishes the Main Lemma (Lemma 15). We consider standard
instances T for sets of k clusters C. We will show that for
k = n− 1, there is a good set of tasks. By induction on k,
we show the stronger claim that there are many sets of tasks
that are good. The base case (k = 1) is the assumption that
all single tasks are good (Assumption 16).
We use a probabilistic argument to try to keep things
simple. In particular, let 1 − bk be (a lower bound on)
4Note that the cluster of task pk must be trivial after the change. This is
the point where we need the extra parameter δ′ = 2δ. Actually any value















Figure 4. Allocation of the t-player in the (pi, pk)-slice for a regular
set of tasks P = {pi, pk}, and some given standard instance T for
P . Point (α, α) represents T̂ (P ) when P is good (left figure) and
when P is potentially-good but not good (right figure).
the probability that a random regular set of tasks5 P =
(p1, . . . , pk) from C is good for T . We want to show that
the probability bk of P being a bad set of tasks is small, and
in particular that bn−1 < 1, which establishes the existence
of a good set of n− 1 tasks.
Showing that bk is small.: We show that bk is small by
considering potentially-good sets P = (p1, . . . , pk) of size
k that contain tasks from distinct clusters (Q1, . . . , Qk) to
establish the following two facts:
Fact a. the probability that a randomly selected set
P = (p1, . . . , pk) is potentially-good is at least
1− (3n/δ − 1)bk−1 (Lemma 30).
Fact b. if P = (p1, . . . , pk) is a potentially-good set
of tasks, either P is good itself or (P−k, p′k) is
good with probability at least 1−2n3/`, where p′k
is a random sibling of pk (Lemma 28). Roughly
speaking, either P is good or almost all other sets
are good (with exponentially small probability of
the negative event).
By Assumption 16, there is no bad task, hence b1 = 0, and
then in Lemma 31 we show how to combine these two facts
in order to get that bk is bounded above by 3n3/`(3n/δ)k−2
(Lemma 31). If we allow the number `+1 of tasks per cluster
to be sufficiently large, this shows that bn−1 < 1.
Showing Fact b.: The difficult part is to establish the
second of the above two facts (Fact b). Let’s assume that P
is potentially-good but not good. We show that (P−k, p′k) is
good for many p′k’s, as follows
• first, we observe that there is a witness of potential
goodness of P for which all tasks in P = (p1, . . . , pk)
are given to the s-players. This essentially follows from
the definition of potentially-good and weak monotonic-
ity (Lemma 20)
• let p′k be a sibling of pk and consider the (pk, p
′
k)-
slice mechanism. This is exactly the point where we
exploit the 2 × 2 characterization that we provide in
Section II-C. The proof proceeds by treating carefully
all possible cases
5In the argument, we select random tasks and instances. All random
selections are from uniform distributions and independent.
affine minimizers: we show that the mecha-
nism is not an affine minimizer almost surely
(Lemma 22) and the stronger claim that they
do not exist (Lemma ??)
relaxed affine minimizers: we show that the
probability that the mechanism is a relaxed
affine minimizer is at most 2n2/` (Lemma 25)
1-dimensional and constant mechanisms:
we show that 1-dimensional and constant
mechanisms do not occur, otherwise the ap-
proximation ratio is high (Lemma 26)
task independent or relaxed task inde-
pendent mechanisms: we show that if the
mechanism is task independent or relaxed task
independent for each of k appropriately se-
lected random instances from the witness, then
(P−k, p
′
k) is good (Lemma 27)
• we conclude that for a random sibling p′k, the mech-
anism must be either task independent or relaxed task
independent for all these k instances with probability
at least 1 − k 2n2/`; therefore (P−k, p′k) is good with
probability at least 1− 2n3/`. (Lemma 28).
The first item, i.e., to show that affine minimizers are
sparse, exploits an interesting use of goodness and linearity.
This is where the strange second point of Definition 17 is
needed. The proof of relaxed affine minimizers uses the same
machinery, but it has an extra layer of difficulty, which arises
from having to guarantee that the action happens at the linear
part and not at the bundling tail of these mechanisms. In
fact, we might have a positive probability (at most 2n3/`)
to pick a wrong sibling p′k solely due to bundling tails of
relaxed affine minimizers. The proof of the last item about
task independent and relaxed task independent mechanisms
has very similar flavor. It is essentially this part that takes
away the complications that arise from having to deal with
an additive domain.
The core of the argument for (relaxed) affine minimizers
uses the characterization of the (pk, p′k)-slice mechanism
in a way that seems peculiar at first glance. Instead of
focusing on the (pk, p′k)-slice mechanism, it focuses on the
slice (pi, pk), for some pi ∈ P−k. The reason is simple:
the characterization is only used to extract the property
that the allocation of pk has linear boundaries, and then
taking advantage of the fact —due to potentially-goodness
property— that the (pi, pk)-slice mechanism exhibits a tight
connection between the allocation boundaries of pi and pk,
we can argue about the allocation of task pi. A similar
argument is used when the (pk, p′k)-slice mechanism is task
independent.
D. General lemmas
We start by establishing some useful facts.
Lemma 18. Let P = {p1, . . . , pk} be a potentially-good set
of tasks for T with witness V and let T ′ be an instance in the
set of V -perturbations of T̂ (P ). Consider a sibling p′k of pk
and assume that the (pk, p′k)-slice mechanism for T
′ is an
affine minimizer or a relaxed affine minimizer with boundary
function ψpk(spk) for task pk, which is linear when we fix the
values of all other tasks i.e., ψpk(spk) = max(0, λ spk − γ)
for some λ and γ that may depend on all other values but
not on tpk and spk . Suppose further that ψpk(1) > 0. Then
the approximation ratio of the mechanism (for all tasks) is
at least 1 + max(λ, 1/λ)− δ′.
We assume that the mechanism has approximation ratio
less than ρ, which means that if a (p, p′)-slice mecha-
nism is an affine minimizer or a relaxed affine minimizer,
the coefficient λ of its linear boundary is in the interval
[1/(ρ − 1 + δ′), ρ − 1 + δ′]. This guarantees that for some
task pk, if the spk changes by ∆spk , then the boundary
for tpk changes by at least ∆spk/(ρ − 1 + δ′) and at most
(ρ − 1 + δ′)∆spk . We will take advantage of this fact in
Lemma 21, where we will combine this with the second
condition in the definition of potentially-good set of tasks.
This second condition states that P−k is good for instances
in which task pk has values [tpk = δ, spk = qδ/(2n)], for
q = 0, 1, . . . , 2n/δ. For successive values of q, spk changes
by δ/(2n). The above lemma allows us to conclude that
successive values of the boundary of tpk change by at most
ρδ/(2n) ≤ δ/2 and that one of these values is less than
δ (see the proof of Lemma 21 for details). This goal lies
behind the complicated definition of potentially-good set of
tasks.
Lemma 19. Let T be a standard instance for a regular set
of tasks P = (p1, . . . , pk). Let T ′ = (t′, s) be an instance
with t′pi ∈ (α, α + β), i ∈ [k], which agrees with T on the
remaining tasks. If all tasks in P are allocated to the 0-
player in the allocation of T ′, then there exists V such that
P is good for T with witness V .
The next lemma shows that all tasks of a potentially-
good but not good set P of tasks must be allocated to the
s-players. Furthermore, P is a minimal or critical set in
the sense that if we lower the t-value of one of its tasks,
the allocation for all of them changes. The first part of the
definition of potentially-good sets of tasks is designed to
achieve exactly this goal.
Lemma 20. Suppose that P = (p1, . . . , pk) is a potentially-
good set of tasks for T with witness V. If P is not good for
T and there exists no bad task, then for every instance of the
set of V -perturbations of T̂ (P ), all tasks in P are allocated
to the s-players. Furthermore, for each i ∈ [k], if we change
the t-value of only task pi to β, all tasks in P are allocated
to the 0-player.
E. Almost all sets are good
We now consider a potentially-good but not good set of
tasks P = (p1, . . . , pk) from clusters (Q1, . . . , Qk). Let p′k
be a sibling of pk, i.e., another task of cluster Qk. The main
result of this section establishes that almost all other sets
(P−k, p
′
k) are good; we show via a probabilistic argument
that (P−k, p′k) is good with probability at least 1 − 2n3/`,
where p′k is a random sibling of pk (Lemma 28).
In order to show this result, we consider the (pk, p′k)-
slice mechanism, utilizing the 2 × 2 characterization that
we provide in Section II-C, considering all possible cases.
Specifically, in Section III-E1 we exclude (almost surely)
affine minimizers (Lemma 22), in Section III-E2 we bound
from above the probability that the mechanism is a relaxed
affine minimizer by 2n2/` (Lemma 25) and in Section
III-E3 we exclude 1-dimensional and constant mechanisms
(Lemma 26). Finally in Section III-E4 we show that if the
mechanism is task independent or relaxed task independent
for each of k appropriately selected random instances from
the witness, then (P−k, p′k) is good (Lemma 27).
We conclude that for a random sibling p′k, the mechanism
must be either task independent or relaxed task independent
for all these k instances with probability at least 1−k 2n2/`;
therefore (P−k, p′k) is good with probability at least 1 −
2n3/`. (Lemma 28).
1) Affine minimizers: The following lemma (Lemma 21)
deals with the case that the (pk, p′k)-slice mechanism is an
affine minimizer or in the linear part of a relaxed affine
minimizer. It is essential in showing that very few slice-
mechanisms are of this type.
Lemma 21. Assume that there is no bad task and that
the approximation ratio is at most ρ. Suppose that P =
(p1, . . . , pk) is a potentially-good but not good set of tasks
for T with witness V . There are no instances T1, T2 such
that
• both T1 and T2 belong to the set of V -perturbations of
T̂ (P )
• T1 and T2 differ only in the value of tpi , for some fixed
i ∈ [k − 1]
• for both T1 and T2, the boundary function ψpk is
truncated linear in spk . That is,
ψpk(t−pk , s) = max(0, λ(t−pk , s−pk)spk − γ(t−pk , s−pk)),
for both T1 and T2.
The above lemma is crucial and its importance is captured
by the next lemma that essentially states that linear 2 × 2
mechanisms do not exist almost surely.
Lemma 22. Suppose that P = (p1, . . . , pk) is a potentially-
good but not good set of tasks for T with witness V . Take
a random instance T ′ from the set of V -perturbations of
T̂ (P ). Fix all other values to T ′ except for task pk, and
consider the event E that the boundary function ψpk(spk) is
linear in spk . The probability of event E is 0.
2) Relaxed affine minimizers: Lemma 22 essentially ex-
cludes the case of 2 × 2 affine minimizers. We now want
to deal with the case of relaxed affine minimizers. This
presents an additional difficulty as we may not be in the
linear part of the mechanism but at its tail. Although this
seems like a special case, it adds another complication to
the proof and we need to handle it carefully. We deal with
this problem by showing that for most siblings p′k, the 2×2
mechanism cannot be a relaxed affine minimizer, since then
it will be in its linear part and it will remain in the linear
part when we change the spk value, and hence we can treat
it like in Lemma 21. To achieve this, we first show that
not many tasks can be allocated to the k player, otherwise
the approximation ratio is high (Lemma 23 below). This
is useful, because when a task p′k is allocated to the 0-
player, and the (pk, p′k)-slice mechanism is a relaxed affine
minimizer, we can guarantee that it is in the linear part of
the mechanism and it will remain there when we change spk
(see Lemma 24 below).
Lemma 23. Suppose that P = (p1, . . . , pk) is a potentially-
good set of tasks for T with witness V and that the
approximation ratio is less than ρ. For every instance of
the set of V -perturbations of T̂ (P ), fewer than 2n2 siblings
of pk are allocated to the k-player.
In the above lemma, we can easily improve the number
of tasks from 2n2 to O(n), by a simple tightening of its
proof, but we again opt for simplicity.
Lemma 24. Fix an instance T with tp′ > 0, two tasks
p and p′ of the same cluster and assume that the (p, p′)-
slice mechanism for T is a relaxed affine minimizer. If the
mechanism allocates task p′ to 0-player but not task p, then
this instance is not in the bundling tail of the relaxed affine
minimizer, and the same holds for every value of sp. That
is, the boundary of ψp(sp) is linear for any value of sp, for
fixed values for t−p and s−p.
One of the premises of the previous lemma is that tp′ > 0.
We will apply this lemma when tp′ = β.
We now use a probabilistic argument that combines the
above lemmas to show that the probability of relaxed affine
minimizers is bounded by 2n2/`.
Lemma 25. Suppose that P = (p1, . . . , pk) is a potentially-
good but not good set of tasks for T with witness V . Take a
random instance T ′ from the set of V -perturbations of T̂ (P )
and a random sibling p′k of pk. We consider the (pk, p
′
k)-
slice mechanism of tasks pk and p′k when we fix the values
according to T ′ for the other tasks. The probability that
this 2× 2 mechanism is a relaxed affine minimizer or affine
minimizer is at most 2n2/`.
3) 1-dimensional and constant mechanisms: Here, we
show that 1-dimensional and constant slice mechanisms can
be immediately excluded.
Lemma 26. Suppose that P = (p1, . . . , pk) is a potentially-
good set of tasks for T with witness V . Fix a sibling p′k of pk
and some instance T ′ in the set of V -perturbations of T̂ (P ).
Suppose that the (pk, p′k)-slice mechanism for T is a 1-
dimensional or a constant mechanism. Then the mechanism
has approximation ratio at least ρ.
4) Task independent and relaxed task independent mech-
anisms: In this subsection we deal with task independent
and relaxed task independent slice mechanisms. The next
lemma is analogous to Lemma 21 for task independent or
relaxed task independent slice mechanisms. There is another
layer of difficulty in this case, since we need to take k
instances instead of just two instances that we considered in
the linear case. The difference is that the goal of Lemma 21
was to essentially exclude linear mechanisms, but the goal
of the next lemma is to show that task independent slice
mechanisms imply abundance of good sets of tasks.
Lemma 27. Suppose that P = (p1, . . . , pk) is a potentially-
good but not good set of tasks for T with witness V . Fix
a sibling p′k of pk. Suppose that there exists instances T0,
T1,. . . , Tk−1 such that for every i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}
• Ti belongs to the set of V -perturbations of T̂ (P )
• for every i 6= 0, Ti differs from T0 only in the value of
tpi ; furthermore, the value of Ti for this task is higher
than the value of T0
• the (pk, p′k)-slice mechanism for Ti is a task indepen-
dent or a relaxed task independent mechanism.
Assuming that there is no bad task and that approximation
ratio is less that ρ, the set of tasks (P−k, p′k) is good for T .
Taking advantage of the above lemma, we now show that
either a potentially-good set of tasks is also good or there
are many other good sets.
Lemma 28. Suppose that P = (p1, . . . , pk) is a potentially-
good set of tasks for T with witness V . Then either P is good
for T or the probability that (P−k, p′k) is good for T , for a
random sibling p′k of pk, is at least 1− 2n3/`.
F. Existence of a good set of tasks of size n− 1
The above analysis culminated in Lemma 28. In this sub-
section, we use this lemma to show the existence of a good
set of tasks of size n−1 (Corollary 32), which immediately
concludes the proof of the Main Lemma (Lemma 15). We
will use a probabilistic argument again, so we first define
the probability bk that a regular set of k tasks is bad.
Definition 29 (Probability bk). Fix a mechanism and sup-
pose that T is a standard instance for a set C of k clusters.
Let us denote by b(T, C) the probability that a random
regular set P of k tasks from C is not good and let bk
denote the maximum possible b(T, C) —or more precisely,
its supremum— for all choices of T and C, for the given
mechanism.
First, we find an upper bound on the probability that a
random regular set of tasks of size k is not potentially-good,
based on the probability that a set of size k− 1 is not good.
Lemma 30. Fix any instance T which is standard for a set
C of k ≥ 2 clusters, and let P be a random regular set of k
tasks from C. The probability that P is not potentially-good
for T is at most (3n/δ − 1)bk−1.
The following lemma estimates a rough upper bound on
the probability that a random regular set is not good. It shows
that if ` has exponential size in n, the probability that there
exists a good regular set of n− 1 tasks is positive.
Lemma 31 (Probability of bad sets). Fix a mechanism with
approximation ratio less than ρ and suppose that there is no










for every k ∈ [n− 1].
Using this, we can now reach the target of this section,
showing that there exists a good set of size n− 1.





, we get bn−1 < 1, and
there exists at least one good set of n− 1 tasks.
G. Lower bound on the approximation ratio
In this subsection we use the Main Lemma (Lemma 15)
to prove a lower bound of 1 +
√
n− 1.
Theorem 33. The approximation ratio of truthful mecha-
nisms is at least 1 +
√
n− 1.
Remark. To achieve a ratio very close to 1 +
√
n− 1, we
must select a small δ′. By Corollary 32, this has implications
on the number of tasks required by the proof of the main
lemma (Lemma 15). In particular the number of tasks per






Note that by any choice of δ < 1, this number is at least
exponential in n.
IV. DISCUSSION
Although we believe that some of the ideas in this work
can be used to fully resolve the Nisan-Ronen conjecture,
there are also some limitations. For example, the idea of
considering instances where tasks can essentially only be
assigned to two machines is quite promising, as it allows
to exploit the 2 × 2 characterization. We refer the reader
to our previous work [8] for a systematic treatment of such
instances, which can be modeled as multi-graphs. Using the
terminology of [8], the instances considered in this work
(Definition 8) are multi-stars. The next theorem shows that
the lower bound of this work is tight for multi-stars.
Theorem 34. The approximation ratio for the set of in-
stances of Definition 8 is at most 1 +
√
n− 1 and it is
achieved by a weighted version of the VCG mechanism.
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